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SECURITIES-SUFFICIBNCY OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIPTION AND
THE NoTicE PROVIDED BY A REcoRDED CHATTEL
MORTGAGE-The great number of decisions which deal with descriptions of property in chattel mortgages may have resulted in a clarifica-
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tion of the applicable law. Such continuous litigation, however, would
seem to indicate that either the law has not yet provided a satisfactory
solution to the description problem or that the real difficulty lies outside the area of description. If the controversy is between the mortgagor
and the mortgagee the problems are relatively few, but when persons
who were not original parties to the mortgage enter the picture, the
mobility and lack of unique features which are characteristic of most
chattels have caused problems that call for investigation, analysis and
possibly a revision of the present law. From the mortgagor's point of
view a distinguishing and desirable feature of the chattel mortgage is
that he may either retain or obtain possession of the mortgaged property. Chattel mortgage recording acts have been used to dispel inferences of fraud which may appear in such a situation.1 For the acts to
be effective a recorded mortgage should apprise any interested person
of the mortgagee's security interest. On the other hand the matter of
primary concern to the mortgagee is what he must do to preserve the
security provided by the mortgage. The mortgage of machinery or
household goods is illustrative of the general type of situation to be
discussed and no attempt will be made to consider the special problems
involved in the mortgage of automobiles2 or to treat the conflicts of
laws issues raised by the movement of mortgaged chattels across state
lines. The primary aims of this comment are to point out what the law
requires in the nature of description, to analyze the value of these
requirements in the light of the recording acts, to examine possible
alternative security devices, and to suggest some useful steps that may
be taken to augment the present system.

I. The Legal Requirements
A. Validity as between the Mortgagor and Mortgagee. While the
expression of a theoretical basis is seldom found in the judicial opinions, it is generally held that a chattel mortgage, absent other defects,
is valid if the description is such that the property intended to be mortgaged can be identified.3 Parol evidence is admissible to show the circumstances existing at the time of the mortgage as evidence of intent
and to aid otherwise in identifying the mortgaged property.4 Theoreti11 DURFEB, CASES ON SECURI'lY 489-492 (1951).
2 For a review of the peculiar problems of automobile mortgages see 25 IND. L.J. 337
(1950); 33 MARQ. L. RBv. 54 (1949); 16 Mo. L. REv. 156 (1951).
3 Mott v. Johnson, 112 Wash. 18, 191 P. 844 (1920); Robson v. Maloney, 42 Wash.
(2d) 874, 259 P. (2d) 836 (1953).
4£rich v. Dunl<ly, 79 Cal. App. (2d) 345, 179 P. (2d) 638 (1947); 1 JoNEs,
CHA'ITEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES 94 (1933).
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cally this rule can be explained in a "title" state by analogy to the
princip~e of property law that a conveyance which does not adequately
identify the property to be conveyed is void. 5 In a "lien" state it would
seem that a consensual lien is created only when the description, a
term of the mortgage contract, is sufficiently definite to be capable of
legal enforcement.6 Thus the general rule is explainable under either
theory of chattel mortgages and seems relatively free from objection in
its practical application.
B. The Requirement of Notice to Third Parties. When questions arise involving persons who were not parties to the mortgage, the
inquiry shifts from the validity of the mortgage to the sufficiency of
notice which the mortgage will supply to non-parties once it is recorded.
Without distinguishing between purchasers from the mortgagor,7 purchasers at a foreclosure sale,8 persons claiming by virtue of an execution,0 or other mortgagees,1° the almost universal starting point of the
courts in these cases is that the description must suggest reasonable
inquiries, which, when pursued, will lead to an identification of the
mortgaged property.11 While parol evidence may be admitted to aid
in identifying a chattel as that which was intended to be mortgaged,
it is not admissible to supply omissions in the written mortgage once
recorded.12 Beyond the general rule as stated, the cases do not contain
many factual similarities. However, the courts have indicated that the
inclusion of certain information in the description, viz., ownership,
location or possession of the property at the time of the mortgage will
5 4 TIFFANY, REAL ·PROPERTY, 3d ed., §990 (1939).
61 WILLISTON, CoNTRA.crrs, rev. ed., §24 (1936); 1 ConnIN, CoNTRAcrrs §100
(1950). To the effect that contract principles are applicable to description problems in
chattel mortgages see Raeuber v. Central Nat. Bank, (D.C. Ohio 1953) 112 F. Supp. 865.
7 Huse v. Estabrooks, 67 Vt. 223, 31 A. 293 (1894); Scoggan v. Dillion, (Ky. 1952)
252 S.W. (2d) 35; Neece v. Guerin, 210 Ark. 954, 198 S.W. (2d) 161 (1946); Tragar
v. Jackson, 230 Minn. 544, 42 N.W. (2d) 16 (1950).
8 Shellhammer v. Jones, 87 Iowa 520, 54 N.W. 363 (1893).
9 The Westinghouse Co. v. McGrath, 131 Iowa 226, 108 N.W. 449 (1906); Trinity
State Bank v. Bowie Contracting Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) 232 S.W. (2d) 863;
McFerrin v. Clarksville Wood Industries, 217 Ark. 383, 230 S.W. (2d) 49 (1950).
lOPreston v. Caul, 109 Iowa 443, 80 N.W. 522 (1899); Sims v. McFadden, 217
Ark. 810, 233 S.W. (2d) 375 (1950); Mathews v. Couie, (La. App. 1948) 35 S. (2d)
794.
111 JoNEs, CHATrEL MoRTGAGEs AND CoNDITIONAL SALES §54 (1933); A.L.I.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE §9-110 (1952) provides: "For purposes of this Article any
description is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies the thing
described."
12 Tragar v. Jackson, 230 Minn. 544, 42 N.W. (2d) 16 (1950); Garmon v. Fitzgerald, 168 Miss. 532, 151 S. 726 (1934); 1 JoNEs, CHATTEL MoRTGAGEs AND CoNDITIONAL SALES 94 (1933).
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enable the mortgage to satisfy the "reasonable inquiry" test. 13 When
the chattel is unusually difficult to describe the court will often state
that the mortgagee has done the best he could as a justification of a
decision in favor of the mortgagee.14 Although many chattels do not
have distinguishing serial numbers, the omission of such numbers
where available may cause a court to find the description to be inadequate.15 It would seem that a careful mortgagee can meet the test of
"reasonable inquiry" by including the following items in his mortgage:
the number and a general description of the chattels, either the location,
ownership or possession of the mortgaged property, and any serial
numbers or other features peculiar to the chattel in question.

IL Value of the Description Requirements in Light of the
Scope of the Recording Acts
While the legal standard of an effective description is fairly clear,
the value of a description which measures up to this standard in imparting notice to third parties is questionable. Assuming that a third
person can discover and examine a mortgage by searching the public
records, the "reasonable inquiry" test would seem to provide a commendable distribution of the burdens of identifying the mortgaged
property. When a mortgage is executed containing information as to
the location or possession of a chattel sufficient to meet the "reasonable
inquiry" test, neither its validity nor its notice value is legally affected
by a subsequent change in these facts. 16 But when the mortgagor takes
the mortgaged property out of the county in which the mortgage is
13 The Westinghouse Co. v. McGrath, 131 Iowa 226, 108 N.W. 449 (1906);
Everett v. Brown, 64 Iowa 420, 20 N.W. 743 (1884); Huse v. Estabrooks, 67 Vt. 223,
31 A. 293 (1894); Hauseman Motor Co. v. Napierella, 223 Ky. 433, 3 S.W. (2d) 1084
(1928).
14Adamson v. Horton, 42 Minn. 161, 43 N.W. 849 (1889); B. M. Behrends Bank
v. Satre, (D.C. Alaska 1953) 109 F. Supp. 917.
15 Walker v. Fitzgerald, 157 Minn. 319, 196 N.W. 269 (1923); United States v.
United Aircraft Corp., (D.C. Conn. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 52; Burroughs Adding Mach. Co.
v. Robertson, (6th Cir. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 619.
16 B. M. Behrends Bank v. Satre, (D.C. Alaska 1953) 109 F. Supp. 917; Adamson
v. Horton, 42 Minn. 161, 43 N.W. 849 (1889). A.L.I. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE
§9-401(3) (1952) provides: "A filing which is made in the proper place in this state
remains effective even though the debtor's residence or place of business or the location of
the collateral is thereafter changed [Alternative provision: a filing which is made in the
proper county in this state remains effective for one hundred and twenty days after the
debtor's residence or place of business or the location of the collateral is changed to another
county of this state but becomes ineffective thereafter unless a copy of the financing statement signed by the secured party is filed in the new county within said period.]" Pa.
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 12A, §9-401(3) is an adoption of this alternative provision.
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recorded, a search of the records of the county in which the chattel is
now located would prove to be a fruitless task. A description, no matter
how detailed and accurate, would be of no value in such a case. And
if, for example, the mortgagor sells the property to one who is not
aware of the mortgagee's interest in the chattel, a search of the record
for mortgages of that subsequent purchaser by one with whom he is
dealing would not reveal the existence of the encumbrance on the
chattel. Thus in many instances a third person will be unable to discover the existence of the mortgage, let alone try to identify the mortgaged property; yet he is charged with constructive notice of the mortgagee's interest in the chattel. It appears that the law leaves something
to be desired, not so much in its description requirements, but in the
scope of the recording acts.

III. Alternative Security Devices
It would seem that creditors should be encouraged, if only by a
stricter application of the "reasonable inquiry" test, to use a security
device which not only is satisfactory from the creditor's viewpoint, but
which overcomes the notice complications existent in the present chattel mortgage law.
A. The Pledge. The usefulness of the pledge is greatly limited
by the requirement that the pledgee have possession of the pledged
chattel or lose his security interest;17 this has been pointed to as a principal factor in the development of the chattel mortgage.18 Functional
limitations would seem to negate any notice advantages to be gained
through the greater use of the pledge.
B. Conditional Sales Contracts. Although the conditional sale
seems to be satisfactory from the creditor's point of view, it appears to
have no advantage over the purchase money chattel mortgage in supplying notice to subsequent purchasers. The conditional sales contract
is recorded on a town or county basis19 and the "reasonable inquiry"
test is used to determine the adequacy of a conditional sales contract
property description. 20
17BRoWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §135 (1936).
181 DURFEE, CASES ON SECURITY 486 (1951).
19 2 U.L.A. IO (1922) states that twenty-three states require recording on a countywide basis while seven states provide for recording in the office of the town clerk. 2 U .L.A.
44 (1953 Supp.) indicates that since the original compilation two additional states provide
for county-wide recording while a third has changed from town to county recording.
20National Cash Register Co. v. Marks, (6th Cir. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 628; Trusco
Finance Co. v. Childs, 87 Ga. App. 789, 75 S.E. (2d) 336 (1953); CIT Corp. v. De-
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C. The Trust Receipt. The trust receipt is not advantageous in
the single transaction situation where one or a few chattels are used as
security. 21 The entruster cannot proceed against one who, without
actual notice of the limitations on the trustee's power of sale, purchases
from the trustee. 22 The chattel mortgagee, on the other hand, may
bring an action not only against the debtor but also against those taking
possession from the debtor. 23
Considering both the value of the security device to the creditor
and its features as a provider of notice to third parties, it appears that
at the present time no security device superior to the chattel mortgage
is available for use in the situation under discussion.

IV. Improving the Chattel Mortgage
Since there is an apparent lack of satisfactory substitutes for the
chattel mortgage, improvements on that device might well be in order.
It has been pointed out above that the narrow scope of operation of
common recording acts denies to the creditor any real assurance that
the chattel will not be moved to a new location and there be sold.
Various attempts have been made to broaden the scope of the recording
acts while still retaining a fundamentally county-wide system. Many
statutes require that the mortgage be recorded in the county in which
the mortgagor resides if he is a resident of the state when the mortgage
is executed.24 The quite obvious purpose of this requirement is to
protect third parties dealing with the mortgagor after he has carried
the mortgaged property out of the county in which the mortgage was
executed. Other statutes require a recording of the mortgage in the
county where the property is located when the mortgage is executed. 25
At least one state also requires that if the property is moved out of the
Graff Lumber Co., 194 Minn. 169, 259 N.W. 807 (1935). Cf. Burroughs Adding Mach.
Co. v. Robertson, (6th Cir. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 619.
219A U.L.A. 314 (1951) states: "This act shall not apply to single transactions of
legal or equitable pledge, not constituting a course of business, whether such transactions
be unaccompanied by delivery of possession, or involve constructive delivery, or delivery
and redelivery, actual or constructive, so far as such transactions involve only an entruster
who is an individual natural person, and a trustee entrusted as a fiduciary with handling
investments or finances of the entruster. • . ."
22 9A U.L.A. 304 (1951).
23 Neece v. Guerin, 210 Ark. 954, 198 S.W. (2d) 161 (1946); Tragar v. Jackson,
230 Minn. 544, 42 N.W. (2d) 16 (1950); Smith & Co. v. McLean, 24 Iowa 322 (1868);
United States v. United Aircraft Corp., (D.C. Conn. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 52.
24 ill. Stat. Ann. (1950) c. 95, §4; Iowa Code Ann. (1950) §556.3; Mich. Comp. Laws
(1948) §566.140; 32 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940) §232; Ohio Rev. Code
(Baldwin, 1953) §1319.02.
25 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) §2957; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §566.140.
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county within a reasonable time thereafter the mortgage must be recorded in the county to which the property is removed. 26 Where this is the
state of the law, a search of the records of the county in which the chattel
is located will reveal the mortgage in most cases where the mortgagor
is in possession of the chattel. To strengthen the overall system, civil27
and criminal28 penalties have been applied to persons disposing of the
mortgaged property without informing the transferee of the encumbrance thereon. While various combinations of these scope-widening
provisions have been utilized, it would seem that a much better method
of broadening the scope of the recording acts is available. Suggesting
that a title certificate system similar to that used for automobiles be used
for every chattel would seem to present the best solution to the notice
problem, but such a system is obviously impractical. Congress indicated
a possible solution when it provided that all aircraft mortgages be
recorded in Washington, D. C.29 thereby enabling one dealing with
the possessor of an airplane to ascertain whether or not that person has
mortgaged the property. This might be effective in the case of a particular chattel, but the administrative burden would probably prevent
utilizing this system for all chattel mortgages. Yet it would seem that
a state-wide recording system may well be the answer to many of the
problems inherent in the present system ~nd would nullify many of
the complications caused by the mobility of chattels.30 Under such a
2 6 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) §2957; A.L.I. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL Coo:a
§9-401(3) (1952) (alternate provision).
21 ID. Stat. Ann. (1950) c. 95, §6.
28 Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1949) §538; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §2151; Ohio
Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §1319.18. Here the description must be sufficient to meet
only the test of validity between the parties. Albritton v. State, (Miss. 1951) 52 S.
(2d) 608; State v. Murphy, 214 S.C. 517, 53 S.E. (2d) 402 (1949).
20 62 Stat. L. 494 (1948), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §523. United States v. United Air- ·
craft Corp., (D.C. Conn. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 52, represents an application of the "reasonable inquiry" test under this statute.
ao A.L.I. UNIFORM CoMMI!RCIAL Coo:a §9-401 (1952), provides: "(I) If filing is
required by this Article (subsection (1) of Section 9-302) in order to perfect a security
interest, the place of filing is as follows: (a) when the collateral is accounts other than
those arising from the sale of farm products by a farmer, chattel paper, contract rights,
inventory or equipment other than equipment used in farming operations, then in the
office of the (Secretary of State) (and in addition if all of the debtor's places of business
are in a single county, in the office of the •••• of that county); (b) when the collateral
is consumer goods, equipment used in farming operations, farm products, or accounts arising
from the sale of farm products by a farmer, then ••• in the county of the debtor's residence
or if the debtor is not a resident of this State then • • • in the county where the goods are
kept, and in addition when the collateral is crops • • • in the county where the land on
which the crops are growing or to be grown is located." In its adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code, Pennsylvania went a long way toward clarifying this provision. Pa.
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 12A, §9-401: "(l) If filing is required by this Article
(subsection (1) of Section 9-302) in order to perfect a security interest, the place of
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system one letter to the state office in which chattel mortgages are
recorded would answer the question of whether or not a named person
has mortgaged chattels and, if so, a copy of the mortgage or mortgages
should be available to determine which chattels have been mortgaged.
Of course, state-wide recording would not prevent unauthorized sales
to third parties followed by further sales by such purchasers, nor would
such recording solve problems arising from the movement of mortgaged chattels across state lines. But if civil and criminal sanctions for
the disposition of mortgaged property without notifying the transferee
of the encumbrance are added to a system of state-wide recording,
some of the existing failures of the present recording system would
be eliminated. A disadvantage of such a system would appear in the
delay causecl in consummating transactions. However, where the transaction is such that one is willing to make an investigation as to encumbrances, the disadvantage of delay would be outweighed by the element
of safety introduced. While piecemeal legislation is no doubt valuable,
the possibility of state-wide recording offers a comprehensive solution
to the problem and should be seriously considered by the legislature of
every state which has not enacted such a statute.

Judson M. Werbelow, S.Ed.
filing is as follows: (a) when the collateral is accounts other than those arising from
the sale of farm products • • • or is chattel paper, contract rights, inventory or equipment
other than equipment used in £arming operations, then in the office of the Secretary of
Co=onwealth and in addition if all of the debtor's places of business are in a single
county, in the office of the prothonotary of that county." Emphasis added. This section
clearly provides for state-wide recording of chattel mortgages.

